A surprising contact on LinkedIn. An offer of employment from a headhunter, probably a young woman, operating from China. The chance to earn perhaps £20,000 on the side preparing a small number of political analyses for a firm from China containing “non-public” or privileged information. Compensation in digital currency or physical money favored.
It might appear clear, on this telling, that an element about this approach would be amiss. However, Beijing's influential intelligence agency still considers it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to try it – prompting MI5 to warn repeatedly about their operations on the internet.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
In 2023, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum stated Chinese agents were contacting UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a frequency of ten thousand over the previous 30-month period, seeking political, commercial, defense and technological classified information. However a new initiative targeting politicians and parliament has led the spy agency to take further action.
A spying alert was issued on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to contact MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, research organizations – anybody who might provide information.
Security Approach and Legislative Changes
In the typical manner of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. But the service knew its briefing note would become public once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the press helps the general population more easily recognize interactions with a fraudulent intent.
This warning has the effect of flushing out more information from in and around parliament, though that is not the agency's primary purpose. The service wants public figures to understand that just because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on X or Facebook, it doesn't imply they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service understood to have been reacting to a particular event in the legislature, though the recent actions occur after the embarrassing failure of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide an individual and his associate another person on a legal detail earlier in the autumn.
The two had been charged of working for China – a allegation they rejected – but inability to complete a prosecution under the since replaced Official Secrets Act led to concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Legislation and China's Strategic Goals
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a reminder of its successor: “Those engaging in spying operations face substantial criminal penalties under the new security law.” This constitutes a crime if somebody engages in behavior that could potentially “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
A natural inquiry, though, is what China has to gain. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted access of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. But Beijing is particularly focused in parliament: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being driven by parliamentarians.
Cultural Differences and Ongoing Cyber Threats
To a degree there are distinct approaches too. Autocratic regimes like Beijing's export information gathering methods and the scale of its spy network is vast, engaging 300,000 people. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “China have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is prepared to cultivate people over the extended period and sometimes even the agencies have struggled to distinguish between genuine connections and spying. “China has a low threshold for which details is considered to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on this week, but a sudden turn in the government situation may result in someone rapidly peripheral becomes significant.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless efforts at secret intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the international competition between China and the Western nations at a level under the point of direct conflict. China has increased its cyber operations, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless internet devices.
Chinese authorities is engaged in relentless efforts to find secret informants on UK politics via digital means because it wants to be provocative, to demonstrate power and because it can.